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Aristotle on the Apparent GoodPerception, Phantasia, Thought, and Desire$
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Jessica Moss

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780199656349

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2012

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199656349.001.0001

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Phantasia and the Apparent Good

Phantasia and the Apparent Good

(p.48) 3 Phantasia and the Apparent Good
Aristotle on the Apparent Good

Jessica Moss

Oxford University Press

This chapter develops an account of phantasia which differs from mainstream ones in its minimalism: phantasia can do everything Aristotle attributes to it while being simply what he evidently defines it as, a faculty of preserving and reproducing perceptual experiences. It uses this account to show that phantasia’s crucial role in action involves preserving and reproducing the pleasurable or painful, motivating aspects of perceptions of value. This yields an account of the apparent good: for x to appear good to an agent is for that agent to have a pleasurable, motivating appearance of x through phantasia.

Keywords:   phantasia, imagination, locomotion, de Anima, de Motu Animalium, pleasure, desire, motivation

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