- Title Pages
- Dedication
- Acknowledgments
- List of Figures
- List of Tables
- List of Abbreviations
- List of Contributors
- 1 Introduction: Global Environmental Commons: Analytical and Political Challenges in Building Governance Mechanisms<sup>1</sup>
- Part I Global Issues: Environmental and Governance Challenges
- 2 Environmental Governance: The Aspect of Coordination*
- 3 The Governance of International Environmental Public Goods
- 4 Navigating the Sustainability Transition: Governing Complex and Dynamic Socio-ecological Systems
- Part II Addressing Global Issues by Articulating Local Governance Frameworks
- 5 Polycentric Systems: Multilevel Governance Involving a Diversity of Organizations
- 6 Bargaining over Global Public Goods
- 7 Coalition Theory and Integrated Assessment Modeling: Lessons for Climate Governance
- 8 Governance Issues in a Multinational Cap-and-Trade System: Centralization and Harmonization
- Part III Designing Institutions Taking into Account Social Preferences
- 9 Social Capital and Collective Action in Environmental Governance Revisited
- 10 Global Environmental Problems, Voluntary Action, and Government Intervention
- 11 De Rationibus est Disputandum: Profiling “Warm-glowers”
- Part IV Designing Incentives Mechanisms under the Constraints of the Socio-political Game
- 12 Designing Incentives Regulation for the Environment
- 13 Property Rights as Solutions to the Problems of Open Access: Options and Constraints
- 14 Managing the Global Commons: Principles and Practice
- 15 Conclusion: Governance and Environment: Policy Challenges and Research Questions
- Glossary
- References
- Index
Bargaining over Global Public Goods
Bargaining over Global Public Goods
- Chapter:
- (p.126) 6 Bargaining over Global Public Goods
- Source:
- Global Environmental Commons
- Author(s):
Ben Groom
J. Rupert Gatti
Timo Goeschl
Timothy Swanson
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
Reaching international agreement on the provision of environmental goods is made more difficult when the parties negotiating are asymmetric in the extent of the public good they can provide and the benefits received. In such cases fairness is likely to be as important as efficiency for agreement to be reached. Here these issues are investigated in the context of biodiversity, which typifies this asymmetry. Using cooperative bargaining theory we show that agreements that are unfair are unlikely to be stable. For biodiversity the theory suggests that the current bargaining solution found in the Convention on Biodiversity (CBD) and incremental cost payments, may be unstable for these reasons. This finding is worrying given the destructible nature of biodiversity since the bargaining process may include threats of strategic destruction of these resources, as witnessed in recent bargaining strategies for biodiversity payments employed by Cameroon and Ecuador.
Keywords: cooperative bargaining, benefit sharing, North-South, strategic destruction, convention on biodiversity
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- Title Pages
- Dedication
- Acknowledgments
- List of Figures
- List of Tables
- List of Abbreviations
- List of Contributors
- 1 Introduction: Global Environmental Commons: Analytical and Political Challenges in Building Governance Mechanisms<sup>1</sup>
- Part I Global Issues: Environmental and Governance Challenges
- 2 Environmental Governance: The Aspect of Coordination*
- 3 The Governance of International Environmental Public Goods
- 4 Navigating the Sustainability Transition: Governing Complex and Dynamic Socio-ecological Systems
- Part II Addressing Global Issues by Articulating Local Governance Frameworks
- 5 Polycentric Systems: Multilevel Governance Involving a Diversity of Organizations
- 6 Bargaining over Global Public Goods
- 7 Coalition Theory and Integrated Assessment Modeling: Lessons for Climate Governance
- 8 Governance Issues in a Multinational Cap-and-Trade System: Centralization and Harmonization
- Part III Designing Institutions Taking into Account Social Preferences
- 9 Social Capital and Collective Action in Environmental Governance Revisited
- 10 Global Environmental Problems, Voluntary Action, and Government Intervention
- 11 De Rationibus est Disputandum: Profiling “Warm-glowers”
- Part IV Designing Incentives Mechanisms under the Constraints of the Socio-political Game
- 12 Designing Incentives Regulation for the Environment
- 13 Property Rights as Solutions to the Problems of Open Access: Options and Constraints
- 14 Managing the Global Commons: Principles and Practice
- 15 Conclusion: Governance and Environment: Policy Challenges and Research Questions
- Glossary
- References
- Index
