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Global Environmental CommonsAnalytical and Political Challenges in Building Governance Mechanisms$
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Eric Brousseau, Tom Dedeurwaerdere, Pierre-André Jouvet, and Marc Willinger

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780199656202

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2012

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199656202.001.0001

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Designing Incentives Regulation for the Environment

Designing Incentives Regulation for the Environment

Chapter:
(p.275) 12 Designing Incentives Regulation for the Environment
Source:
Global Environmental Commons
Author(s):

Michael Faure

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199656202.003.0012

This chapter provides an overview of legal and policy instruments that can be used to provide potential polluters with incentives for pollution abatement. The traditional law and economics literature as well as environmental economics are used to show how liability rules, safety regulation, environmental taxation, and emission trading all have specific advantages and disadvantages. It is therefore argued that environmental policy should look for optimal combinations (mixes) of a variety of policy instruments

Keywords:   environmental policy, liability rules, environmental taxation, emission trading, regulation, command and control, interest groups

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