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Scepticism and Reliable Belief$
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José L. Zalabardo

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780199656073

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2012

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199656073.001.0001

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Scepticism and Realism

Scepticism and Realism

Chapter:
(p.166) 8 Scepticism and Realism
Source:
Scepticism and Reliable Belief
Author(s):

José L. Zalabardo

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199656073.003.0008

This chapter explores the possibility that the sceptical problem presented in Chapter 7 can be blamed on a realist conception of cognition as an activity with truth as its goal, with truth construed as independent of human attitudes. It considers first anti-realist attempts to solve the problem by replacing realist truth with a more accessible belief property as the goal of cognition (e.g. warranted assertibility, consensual agreement…). It argues that these construals of cognition face very important difficulties and that they don’t really solve the sceptical problem. Then the chapter provides a brief sketch of a ‘middle position’ between realism and anti-realism that might provide an attractive construal of cognition as well as having the resources for blocking the sceptical argument.

Keywords:   scepticism, realism, cognition, anti-realism, truth

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