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Scepticism and Reliable Belief$
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José L. Zalabardo

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780199656073

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2012

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199656073.001.0001

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Sceptical Arguments

Sceptical Arguments

Chapter:
(p.144) 7 Sceptical Arguments
Source:
Scepticism and Reliable Belief
Author(s):

José L. Zalabardo

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199656073.003.0007

This chapter applies the theory of knowledge developed in Chapters 4–6 to the assessment of sceptical arguments. It shows how the theory deals with the regress argument, arguments based on sceptical possibilities, and the problem of the criterion. It then presents a form of sceptical reasoning that this theory of knowledge can’t block. It concerns the epistemic status of our reflective beliefs about the truth value of our first-order beliefs. It is argued that if the account of knowledge defended in the book is correct, these reflective beliefs can’t be knowledge.

Keywords:   knowledge, scepticism, criterion, regress, sceptical hypotheses, reflective beliefs

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