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Scepticism and Reliable Belief$
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José L. Zalabardo

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780199656073

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2012

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199656073.001.0001

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Knowledge and Truth Tracking

Knowledge and Truth Tracking

(p.41) 3 Knowledge and Truth Tracking
Scepticism and Reliable Belief

José L. Zalabardo

Oxford University Press

This chapter argues that there are three main respects in which Robert Nozick’s account of knowledge needs to be revised. First, a plausible theory of knowledge must attach much more importance to sensitivity (Nozick’s clause 3) that to adherence (Nozick’s clause 4). Second, truth tracking should not be relativized to the method employed in forming the belief. And third, truth tracking has to be restricted to non-inferential knowledge. Inferential knowledge has to be possible in cases in which the subject’s belief doesn’t track the truth.

Keywords:   knowledge, truth-tracking, sensitivity, adherence, methods, Robert Nozick, evidence

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