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Changes of MindAn Essay on Rational Belief Revision$
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Neil Tennant

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780199655755

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2012

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199655755.001.0001

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The Finitary Predicament

The Finitary Predicament

Chapter:
(p.274) Chapter 9 The Finitary Predicament
Source:
Changes of Mind
Author(s):

Neil Tennant

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199655755.003.0009

This chapter provides further argument justifying the claim that our use of finite dependency networks entails no loss at all of theoretical generality, as far as belief revision on the part of rational creatures is concerned. Some basic concepts in mathematical logic are defined, to lay the groundwork for the metatheorem, due to Harvey Friedman, that is proved in the next chapter.

Keywords:   dependency network, theoretical generality, belief revision, metatheorem

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