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Philosophy without Intuitions
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Philosophy without Intuitions

Herman Cappelen

Abstract

The claim that contemporary analytic philosophers rely extensively on intuitions as evidence is almost universally accepted in current meta-philosophical debates and it figures prominently in our self-understanding as analytic philosophers. No matter what area you happen to work in and what views you happen to hold in those areas, you are likely to think that philosophizing requires constructing cases and making intuitive judgments about those cases. This assumption also underlines the entire experimental philosophy movement: Only if philosophers rely on intuitions as evidence are data about n ... More

Keywords: intuitions, evidence, thought experiments, method of cases, conceptual analysis, philosophical methodology, metaphilosophy, experimental philosophy

Bibliographic Information

Print publication date: 2012 Print ISBN-13: 9780199644865
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2012 DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199644865.001.0001

Authors

Affiliations are at time of print publication.

Herman Cappelen, author
University of St Andrews