Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
The Ethics of Information$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Luciano Floridi

Print publication date: 2013

Print ISBN-13: 9780199641321

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2014

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199641321.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2017. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 21 October 2017

Artificial evil

Artificial evil

Chapter:
(p.180) 9 Artificial evil
Source:
The Ethics of Information
Author(s):

Luciano Floridi

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199641321.003.0009

In this chapter, I support the expansion of our taxonomy of evil. Moral reasoning traditionally distinguishes between two types of evil: moral (ME) and natural (NE). The standard view is that ME is the product of human agency, and so includes phenomena such as war, torture and psychological cruelty; that NE is the product of non-human agency, and so includes natural disasters such as earthquakes, floods, disease, and famine; and, finally, that more complex cases are appropriately analysed as a combination of ME and NE. I argue that, as a result of developments in autonomous agents, a new class of interesting and important examples of hybrid evil has come to light. I define it as artificial evil (AE) and defend the view that AE complements ME and NE to produce a more adequate mapping of the phenomenon and concept of evil.

Keywords:   evil, nonsubstantialism, theodicean problem, artificial evil

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .