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Intuitions$
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Anthony Robert Booth and Darrell P. Rowbottom

Print publication date: 2014

Print ISBN-13: 9780199609192

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: August 2014

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199609192.001.0001

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Sceptical Intuitions

Sceptical Intuitions

Chapter:
(p.213) 11 Sceptical Intuitions
Source:
Intuitions
Author(s):

Duncan Pritchard

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199609192.003.0012

The chapter begins by exploring a philosophical case study of the use of intuitions — viz., the debate regarding the problem of radical scepticism, paying particular attention to key figures within this debate such as Barry Stroud, John Austin, and Ludwig Wittgenstein. It contends that this debate demonstrates something interesting about the nature of intuitions and the role that they can play in philosophical inquiry. In particular, the chapter argues that we need to think of the philosophical use of intuitions as at least sometimes involving a significant level of expertise. The chapter closes by considering the relevance of this point about philosophical intuitions to the negative programme in experimental philosophy.

Keywords:   scepticism, Wittgenstein, experimental philosophy, role of intuitions in philosophical inquiry

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