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Necessary IntentionalityA Study in the Metaphysics of Aboutness$
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Ori Simchen

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780199608515

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2012

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199608515.001.0001

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General possibilities

General possibilities

(p.27) 2 General possibilities
Necessary Intentionality

Ori Simchen

Oxford University Press

This chapter completes the requisite modal metaphysical background to the book’s overall argument. It is argued that general possibilities such as the possibility that there be someone or other typing at some point or other in time, are no less determined by what particular things there are and what they are like than particular possibilities such as the possibility that I should be typing right now. The approach is then brought to bear on a prima facie problem for the position: namely, properties that cannot be had contingently but that happen not to be instantiated by anything.

Keywords:   modality, de re, de dicto, essence, actualism

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