The argument in this chapter examines two accepted palliative care measures that may have the capacity to hasten death: pain control by means of high doses of opioids and terminal sedation. The standard defence of these measures through the Doctrine of Double Effect is then explored and three conclusions are drawn: (1) the Doctrine has no application to these end‐of‐life cases since it assumes that death is invariably a harm; (2) the concept of intention does not allow a bright line to be drawn between permissible and impermissible measures; and (3) in these end‐of‐life contexts the intending/foreseeing distinction makes no ethical difference.
Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.
If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.