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Oxford Studies in Philosophy of LawVolume 1$
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Leslie Green and Brian Leiter

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780199606443

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199606443.001.0001

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Criminal Law, Philosophy, and Psychology: Working at the Crossroads

Criminal Law, Philosophy, and Psychology: Working at the Crossroads

(p.267) 8 Criminal Law, Philosophy, and Psychology: Working at the Crossroads
Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law

Thomas Nadelhoffer

Oxford University Press

This chapter discusses the relevance of recent developments in experimental philosophy and social psychology to fundamental issues that arise in the criminal law — especially when it comes to the decisions made by juries and judges concerning crime and punishment. In light of the empirical research the chapter discusses, it concludes that philosophers and legal theorists alike need to pay more attention to folk intuitions about legal responsibility than has traditionally been the case. In the chapter's view, gaining a perspicuous view of the criminal law requires more work at the cross‐roads of philosophy, psychology, and cognate fields.

Keywords:   criminal law, responsibility, retributivism, experimental philosophy, punishment

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