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Understanding Human Agency$

Erasmus Mayr

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780199606214

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2012

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199606214.001.0001

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(p.297) References

(p.297) References

Source:
Understanding Human Agency
Publisher:
Oxford University Press

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