The present chapter and the one that follows provide detailed analyses of individual intellectual virtues. This chapter treats open‐mindedness. Initial consideration is given to an account of open‐mindedness according to which it consists primarily of a disposition to set aside one's viewpoint about a particular issue in order to give a fair and impartial hearing to an opposing viewpoint. It is argued that this account, while on the right track, fails to do justice to the fact that open‐mindedness can be manifested in contexts void of rational disagreement and that it need not involve any kind of rational assessment. An alternative conception of open‐mindedness is put forth that accommodates these facts. Finally, it is considered when or toward what persons or beliefs it is intellectually virtuous to exercise open‐mindedness.
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