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Mental Causation and Ontology
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Mental Causation and Ontology

S. C. Gibb, E. J. Lowe, and R. D. Ingthorsson

Abstract

Mental causation has been a hotly disputed topic in recent years, with reductive and non-reductive physicalists vying with each other and with dualists over how to accommodate, or else to challenge, two widely accepted metaphysical principles—the principle of the causal closure of the physical domain and the principle of causal non-overdetermination—which together appear to support reductive physicalism, despite the latter’s lack of intuitive appeal. Current debate about these matters appears to have reached something of an impasse, prompting the question of why this should be so. One possibil ... More

Keywords: causal closure, causal non-overdetermination, dualism, mental causation, metaphysics, ontology, physicalism, powers, properties, substances

Bibliographic Information

Print publication date: 2013 Print ISBN-13: 9780199603770
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2013 DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199603770.001.0001

Authors

Affiliations are at time of print publication.

S. C. Gibb, editor
Durham University

E. J. Lowe, editor
Durham University

R. D. Ingthorsson, editor
Lund University, Sweden

Contents

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