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Lying, Misleading, and What is Said
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Lying, Misleading, and What is Said: An Exploration in Philosophy of Language and in Ethics

Jennifer Mather Saul

Abstract

Many people (both philosophers and not) find it very natural to think that deceiving someone in a way that avoids lying — by merely misleading — is morally preferable to simply lying. Others think this preference is deeply misguided. But all sides agree that there is a distinction. In this book, I undertake a close examination of the lying/misleading distinction. First, I use this very intuitive distinction to shed new light on entrenched debates in philosophy of language over notions like what is said. Next, I tackle the puzzling but widespread moral preference for misleading over lying, arri ... More

Keywords: lying, misleading, what is said, semantics, pragmatics, ethics, deception

Bibliographic Information

Print publication date: 2012 Print ISBN-13: 9780199603688
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2013 DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199603688.001.0001

Authors

Affiliations are at time of print publication.

Jennifer Mather Saul, author
University of Sheffield

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