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Hard LuckHow Luck Undermines Free Will and Moral Responsibility$
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Neil Levy

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780199601387

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199601387.001.0001

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Akratic Freedom?

Akratic Freedom?

Chapter:
(p.133) 6 Akratic Freedom?
Source:
Hard Luck
Author(s):

Neil Levy

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199601387.003.0006

Chapter 5 argued that agents are not blameworthy for wrongful actions when they genuinely believe them to be best, all things considered, and are not culpable for that belief. It follows that blame requires that agents act akratically: since we are directly blameworthy only for wrongful actions which we perform despite judging we ought not to, we are directly responsible only for akratic actions. Chapter 6 argues that we are not responsible even for our akratic actions. It examines a variety of different approaches to akrasia. On some approaches, agents fail wholeheartedly to judge that they ought to act otherwise than they do, on others they are compelled to act as they do. The chapter concludes by arguing that akratic actions are lucky actions, and that this is responsibility-undermining luck.

Keywords:   weakness of will, judgment, desire, Michael Smith, capacities, blame

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