This book examines how the United Nations Security Council, in exercising its power to impose binding non-forcible measures (‘sanctions’) under Article 41 of the UN Charter, may violate international law, i.e., limits on its power imposed by the UN Charter itself and by general international law, including human rights guarantees. Such acts may engage the international responsibility of the United Nations, the organization of which the Security Council is an organ. The book then proceeds to examine how (and by whom) the engagement of this responsibility can be determined, i.e., who it is that ... More

This book examines how the United Nations Security Council, in exercising its power to impose binding non-forcible measures (‘sanctions’) under Article 41 of the UN Charter, may violate international law, i.e., limits on its power imposed by the UN Charter itself and by general international law, including human rights guarantees. Such acts may engage the international responsibility of the United Nations, the organization of which the Security Council is an organ. The book then proceeds to examine how (and by whom) the engagement of this responsibility can be determined, i.e., who it is that can find the Council to have acted unlawfully. Most importantly, the book discusses how (and by whom) the responsibility of the UN for unlawful Security Council sanctions can be implemented, i.e., how (and by whom) the UN can be held to account for Security Council excesses. The central thesis is that States can react to unlawful sanctions imposed by the Security Council in a decentralized manner by disobeying the Security Council's command. In international law, this disobedience can be justified as being a countermeasure to the Security Council's unlawful act. Recent practice of States, whether undertaken by executives or, increasingly, by domestic courts, evidences an augmenting tendency to disobey sanctions that are perceived as unlawful. After discussing other possible qualifications of disobedience under international law, the book concludes that this practice can (and should) be qualified as a countermeasure.