Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Law and NeuroscienceCurrent Legal Issues Volume 13$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Michael Freeman

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780199599844

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199599844.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2017. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 22 July 2017

Mens Rea, Logic, and the Brain

Mens Rea, Logic, and the Brain

Chapter:
(p.29) 3Mens Rea, Logic, and the Brain
Source:
Law and Neuroscience
Author(s):

Gert-Jan Lokhorst

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199599844.003.0003

This chapter discusses some recent work in the artificial intelligence and law community on the logic of mens rea ascriptions. It extends this work to give an account of quantified mens rea ascriptions in the sense in which they have been discussed in the legal literature. It studies the consequences of this work for neuroscience. The chapter argues that it is logically impossible to derive de re ascriptions of mens rea — as opposed to de dicto ascriptions — from neuroscientific evidence. In other words: the distinction between wide and narrow scopes in propositional attitude ascriptions, of which logicians have been aware for a long time, has dramatic consequences for the scope and limits of neuroscience in areas that are of interest to the law.

Keywords:   artificial intelligence, law, mens rea ascriptions, neurosceince

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .