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The EU's Decision Traps
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The EU's Decision Traps: Comparing Policies

Gerda Falkner

Abstract

Fritz W. Scharpf's renowned joint‐decision trap model has suggested that the requirements of (nearly) unanimous decisions in the EU's Council of Ministers, combined with conflicting preferences among member governments, will systematically limit the problem-solving effectiveness of European policies. Certain conditions have significantly changed during the 25 years of this theory's existence: the unanimity rule has been replaced by qualified-majority voting in most issue areas, and successive rounds of enlargement have augmented the diversity of member state interests and preferences. This boo ... More

Keywords: European Union, European integration, EU policies, EU decision‐making, problem‐solving capacity, joint‐decision trap

Bibliographic Information

Print publication date: 2011 Print ISBN-13: 9780199596225
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2011 DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199596225.001.0001

Authors

Affiliations are at time of print publication.

Gerda Falkner, editor
Director, Institute for European Integration Research, Austrian Academy of Sciences and Professor, University of Vienna
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