Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Self, No Self?Perspectives from Analytical, Phenomenological, and Indian Traditions$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Mark Siderits, Evan Thompson, and Dan Zahavi

Print publication date: 2010

Print ISBN-13: 9780199593804

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199593804.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 11 December 2018

Self and Subjectivity: A Middle Way Approach

Self and Subjectivity: A Middle Way Approach

Chapter:
(p.114) 4 Self and Subjectivity: A Middle Way Approach
Source:
Self, No Self?
Author(s):

Georges Dreyfus

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199593804.003.0005

This chapter uses insights of the Yogācāra Buddhist tradition to explore some questions concerning consciousness. It is first argued that the Yogācāra view of consciousness provides a middle ground between the extremes of eliminativism and Cartesianism. It is then shown that the Yogācāra view, which emphasizes the close link between the phenomenal aspect of consciousness and reflexivity, is compatible with the no-self position that is at the heart of Buddhist philosophy. The argument rests on the distinction between subjectivity, which for the Yogācāra is connected to the reflexivity intrinsic to each momentary consciousness, and a reified sense of identity. The chapter connects this momentary sense of being oneself with some ideas espoused recently by Damasio. It then concludes by using the Yogācāra idea of a basic consciousness to flesh out a notion of subjectivity that explains some of the features of our first-person perspective without positing a stable self-entity.

Keywords:   Indian philosophy, Buddhist philosophy, Buddhist epistemology, Buddhist views of the mind, consciousness, experience, subjectivity, selfhood, embodiment, self-awareness

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .