Nirvana and Ownerless Consciousness
Buddhists maintain that the enlightened person is freed from the illusion of ‘self’ with its ideas of ‘me’ and ‘mine’. What notion of self is at stake here? What must be the case, with regard to the self and consciousness, for nirvana to be psychologically possible? Is the picture that emerges a plausible one in the philosophy of mind? Part One outlines the notion of self under consideration in the Pali Buddhist sutras. Part Two argues that in Pali Buddhism the self illusion has two tiers: a tier of non-illusory ownerless consciousness, and a tier of content that yields a personalized identity in the world. It is the latter, not the former, that makes the self illusory. Arguments against the alternative ‘bundle theory’ interpretation of no-self in Buddhism are also presented. Part Three gives independent evidence to suggest that the everyday mind is structured by a two-tiered illusion of self.
Keywords: nirvana, ownership, ownerless, first-person perspective, Buddhism, consciousness, self, two-tiered illusion of self, illusion, subject
Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.
Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.
If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.
To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .