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Self, No Self?Perspectives from Analytical, Phenomenological, and Indian Traditions$
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Mark Siderits, Evan Thompson, and Dan Zahavi

Print publication date: 2010

Print ISBN-13: 9780199593804

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199593804.001.0001

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The Experiential Self: Objections and Clarifications

The Experiential Self: Objections and Clarifications

(p.56) 2 The Experiential Self: Objections and Clarifications
Self, No Self?

Dan Zahavi (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This chapter first outlines a view regarding the relationship between consciousness, self-consciousness, and a minimal notion of self that is widespread in the phenomenological tradition. It then discusses some of the motivations behind this proposal, and then in the main part of the chapter critically engages with various objections that have recently been raised against this view by Albahari and Dreyfus. Discussing these objections will allow for an important clarification of the view defended here. Also discussed are some of the semantic and metaphysical disagreements that separate defenders and deniers of self, concluding with some reflections regarding the relation between self and diachronic unity.

Keywords:   self-consciousness, phenomenology, time-consciousness, mineness, experiential self

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