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Sanford C. Goldberg

Print publication date: 2010

Print ISBN-13: 9780199593248

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2010

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199593248.001.0001

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Orthodox Reliabilism and the Epistemic Significance of Testimony

(p.36) 2 Orthodox Reliabilism and the Epistemic Significance of Testimony
Relying on Others

Sanford C. Goldberg (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This chapter explores a position – “Orthodox Reliabilism” – that combines Process Reliabilism with Process Individualism, the thesis that belief‐forming individualistic assumption about the extent of belief‐forming processes. In particular, it examines the options available to this position on the epistemology of testimonial beliefs. It argues that the Orthodox Reliabilist is committed to a very traditional conception of the epistemological significance of testimony, according to which particular testimonies and their properties (including their reliability properties) are to be regarded as features of the hearer's local environment. On such a view, unreliable testimony can constitute a Gettier condition, and so can undermine a subject's claim to knowledge; but this exhausts the epistemic significance of the testimony.

Keywords:   testimony, gettier case, individualism, reliabilism

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