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Conscience and ConvictionThe Case for Civil Disobedience$
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Kimberley Brownlee

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780199592944

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2013

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199592944.001.0001

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Conscience

Conscience

Chapter:
(p.51) 2 Conscience
Source:
Conscience and Conviction
Author(s):

Kimberley Brownlee

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199592944.003.0003

This chapter expands on the conception of conscience presented in Chapter 1. In this view, conscience requires us to cultivate practical wisdom, virtue, and objective moral integrity. This conception of conscience is distinguished from amoral, religious, and subjectivist conceptions, and situates conscience within a pluralistic moral framework. It is argued that the cultivation of conscience is the cultivation of a genuinely valuable, non-optional moral ideal. The nature and value of such an ideal can inform how we, as a society, ought to approach acts of non-conformity that are animated by conscience.

Keywords:   conscience, moral pluralism, objective conceptions of conscience, subjective conceptions of conscience, virtue, ideals

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