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Self-Knowledge$
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Anthony Hatzimoysis

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780199590728

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590728.001.0001

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Self-Knowledge and the Transparency of Belief

Self-Knowledge and the Transparency of Belief

Chapter:
(p.125) 6 Self-Knowledge and the Transparency of Belief
Source:
Self-Knowledge
Author(s):

Brie Gertler

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590728.003.0007

Philosophers such as Gareth Evans and Richard Moran have argued that beliefs are transparent in that a rational thinker can determine whether she believes that p by directly considering whether p. Recently, Alex Byrne and Jordi Fernandez have proposed (independently) that this transparency method generates externalistically warranted second-order beliefs, and can thereby explain our privileged access to our beliefs. This chapter challenges these claims. The transparency method derives its appeal from an overly rationalistic conception of belief. But even those beliefs that satisfy this conception will not be revealed through the use of this method. Determining what we believe requires that we look inward.

Keywords:   attention, belief, judgment, memory, privileged access, rationality, self-knowledge

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