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Anthony Hatzimoysis

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780199590728

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590728.001.0001

McKinsey One More Time

Chapter:
(p.80) 4 McKinsey One More Time
Source:
Self-Knowledge
Author(s):

Crispin Wright (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590728.003.0005

The so‐called McKinsey paradox consists in the apparently valid derivation of apparently non‐apriori knowable propositions about the satisfaction of certain putative external conditions on content from apparently a priori knowable premises. This chapter returns to the suggestion that the correct diagnosis of this paradox discloses a failure broadly comparable to what goes wrong in Moore's notorious “Proof’ of an external world. The chapter offers a further exploration of the relevant notion of warrant transmission failure, then turns to sustain the proposed diagnosis of McKinsey in those terms, albeit with some qualifications.

Keywords:   a priori, belief, externalism, justification, McKinsey paradox, reasoning, self-knowledge, warrant

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