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Anthony Hatzimoysis

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780199590728

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590728.001.0001

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Anti-Individualism, Self-Knowledge, and Epistemic Possibility: Further Reflections on a Puzzle about Doubt

Anti-Individualism, Self-Knowledge, and Epistemic Possibility: Further Reflections on a Puzzle about Doubt

Chapter:
(p.53) 3 Anti-Individualism, Self-Knowledge, and Epistemic Possibility: Further Reflections on a Puzzle about Doubt
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Self-Knowledge
Author(s):

Gary Ebbs (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590728.003.0004

This chapter argues that we cannot have any justification for believing that a given description of a possible world w that is subjectively indistinguishable to us from the actual world supports anti-individualism unless we accept some substantive empirical beliefs that rule out for us that we are in w. This chapter concludes that if we take the standard Twin-Earth thought experiments to support anti-individualism, then we must reject the entrenched assumption that we can make sense of actually being in any possible world that is subjectively indistinguishable to us from the actual world.

Keywords:   a priori, anti-individualism, belief, doubt, epistemic possibility, introspection, justification, knowledge, phenomenal experience, reasoning, self-knowledge, Twin Earth argument

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