Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Understanding Counterfactuals, Understanding CausationIssues in Philosophy and Psychology$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack, and Sarah R. Beck

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780199590698

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2012

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590698.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 17 January 2019

Causation First: Why Causation is Prior to Counterfactuals

Causation First: Why Causation is Prior to Counterfactuals

Chapter:
(p.230) 11 Causation First: Why Causation is Prior to Counterfactuals
Source:
Understanding Counterfactuals, Understanding Causation
Author(s):

Dorothy Edgington

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590698.003.0012

Part 1 gives reasons for thinking that causation is about as basic a concept as there is, and so the hope of giving an informative analysis of the reductive sort, ‘c causes e iff…’, is dim. Part 2 has some criticisms of the attempt to give such an account in terms of counterfactuals. Part 3 argues that, conversely, to the extent that there is one standard, default way of understanding counterfactuals, we need to appeal to causal notions in saying what it is. Part 4 argues that even if there is one standard, default way of assessing counterfactuals, perfectly proper uses of the counterfactual conditional are not always of that kind, and, in context, a much wider class of interpretations of them is permissible.

Keywords:   causation, counterfactuals, David Hume, David Lewis

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .