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MolinismThe Contemporary Debate$
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Ken Perszyk

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780199590629

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2012

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199590629.001.0001

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Theological Determinism and Divine Providence

Theological Determinism and Divine Providence

(p.262) 16 Theological Determinism and Divine Providence

Derk Pereboom

Oxford University Press

This chapter explores the viability of theological determinism as a route to securing a strong doctrine of divine providence. A perennial concern for theological determinism is that it would have God be the author of sin. But on a hard determinist option, God would be the cause of wrongdoing, but not of actions for which we deserve blame, since deserved blame is ruled out by determinism. The extent to which the hard determinist perspective can retain a theistic ethic of guilt, forgiveness, gratitude, and love is then addressed. The article closes with a skeptical theist response to the problem of evil that appeals only to goods that do not involve free will.

Keywords:   God, determinism, providence, free will, moral responsibility, blame, guilt, forgiveness, problem of evil

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