Molinism and Incarnation
This chapter provides a Molinist response to William Hasker's ‘The (Non-) Existence of Molinist Counterfactuals’. Flint differs to some extent with Hasker's presentation of the major anti‐Molinist arguments of the last thirty years, and strives to show just where Hasker's most recent ‘bringing about’ argument fails. He also questions Hasker's suggestion that progress is most likely to be made if we focus our attention primarily on continuing to investigate these arguments. Instead, Flint proposes that more energy should be devoted toward examining the longer history of the dispute over Molinism, toward philosophically developing in greater detail each of the three major views of divine providence, and especially toward applying each of the three general perspectives to particular areas of Christian belief or practice.
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