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Priority in Aristotle's Metaphysics$
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Michail Peramatzis

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780199588350

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199588350.001.0001

The Ontological Priority of Particular Substances

Chapter:
(p. 229 ) 11 The Ontological Priority of Particular Substances
Source:
Priority in Aristotle's Metaphysics
Author(s):

Michail Peramatzis

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199588350.003.0011

It is argued that Aristotelian particular substances are ontologically prior to derivative entities such as non‐substance attributes and accidental compounds. Their ontological priority is specified as a qualified form of [PIB] grounded on the notion of ultimate subjecthood. As ultimate subjects that other things are said of or are present in, particular substances make non‐substance attributes the types of predicable entity that they are but not conversely. This sort of asymmetry, however, is importantly different from their alleged capacity for existing independently of non‐substance attributes (but not conversely). The primacy of particular substance consists in an attenuated notion of [PIB] in which it makes non‐substance entities the generic types of being that they are, i.e. predicable attributes. This predicational version of [PIB] could offer an attractive, unified picture of Aristotelian ontological priority.

Keywords:   particular substance, non‐substance attributes, accidental compounds, subject, ultimate subjecthood, predicables, predication

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