A distinction familiar in logical theory is that between A-expressions used to make singular identifying references, and B-predicate-expressions. Proper names, ordinarily so-called, are a subclass of A-expressions, and are contrasted with descriptive or demonstrative A-expressions. Some A-expressions are used to refer to particulars, some are used to refer to non-particulars. There are many interesting questions about proper names, ordinarily so-called: about the demarcation of the class; about the differences between the modes of operation of proper names on the one hand, and of descriptive and demonstrative phrases on the other; about differences within the class. This chapter focuses on the general distinction (or group of associated distinctions) between referring expressions and predicate-expressions, between reference and description, between subjects (things of which things are predicated) and predicates (things which are predicated of things). By way of justification (or excuse) for this extension of the topic, the chapter refers to Frege's extension of the title.
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