Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
The Moral Psychology Handbook$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

John M. Doris and The Moral Psychology Research Group

Print publication date: 2010

Print ISBN-13: 9780199582143

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2010

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199582143.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2017. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 25 September 2017

Multi‐system Moral Psychology

Multi‐system Moral Psychology

Chapter:
(p.47) 2 Multi‐system Moral Psychology
Source:
The Moral Psychology Handbook
Author(s):

Fiery Cushman

Liane Young

Joshua D. Greene

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199582143.003.0003

This chapter argues for a synthesis of two recent projects in moral psychology. One has proposed a division between “emotional” versus “cognitive” moral judgments, while another has proposed a division between “automatic” versus “controlled” moral judgments. These appear to describe the same underlying psychological systems: one that appears to give rise to automatic, rapid, and emotionally forceful moral intuitions, and another that appears to use controlled, effortful cognition to apply explicit moral principles. These psychological systems can explain a lot about the basic form of competing philosophical normative theories. Some core philosophical deontic principles are mirrored in ordinary people's emotional intuitions; meanwhile, people often use controlled cognitive processes to think about moral problems in utilitarian terms. The chapter concludes by arguing that this division is not hard-and-fast. There is evidence for reasoning from explicit deontic principles in ordinary people; meanwhile, utilitarian thought must depend on some underlying affective currency. This analysis is used to motivate several new questions facing the field of moral psychology.

Keywords:   dual process theory, emotion, cognition, utilitarianism, deontology, intuition, reasoning, moral judgment

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .