Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Institutionalized Reason$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Matthias Klatt

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780199582068

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2012

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199582068.001.0001

Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 30 November 2015

How Law Claims, What Law Claims

(p.29) 2 How Law Claims, What Law Claims
Institutionalized Reason

John Gardner

Oxford University Press

Many people think that law, wherever it may be found, makes certain characteristic assertions, claims, self-presentations, or promises. In recent times, such an idea has been endorsed and relied upon by writers as otherwise diverse as Drucilla Cornell, John Finnis, Philip Selznick, and Jacques Derrida. But it has come to be particularly associated with the work of Joseph Raz and Robert Alexy. Both Raz and Alexy believe that it is part of the very nature of law that all law makes a moral claim. They disagree about what exactly the content of the moral claim is. Raz says it is a claim to moral authority. Alexy says it is a claim to moral correctness. This chapter assesses the thesis on which Raz and Alexy converge, namely that the law claims some moral standing for itself. Is this thesis true? Is it even intelligible? It is argued that this thesis is not only intelligible but true. The chapter attempts to allay various doubts and identifies problems with how the thesis has been presented that may have contributed to the spread of those doubts.

Keywords:   legal philosophy, Joseph Raz, Robert Alexy, moral authority, moral correctness, moral standing, moral claims

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .