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Meaning, Mind, and MatterPhilosophical Essays$
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Ernie Lepore and Barry Loewer

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780199580781

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199580781.001.0001

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A Putnam's Progress

A Putnam's Progress

Chapter:
(p.151) 10 A Putnam's Progress
Source:
Meaning, Mind, and Matter
Author(s):

Ernest Lepore (Contributor Webpage)

Barry Loewer (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199580781.003.0011

According to Putnam, metaphysical realism is the view that world consists of a fixed totality of mind‐independent objects and properties; that truth involves some sort of correspondence relation between words and these objects; and that there is one true complete description of the way the world is. He goes on to argue that this view is incoherent and he wants to replace it with a view he labels internal realism. His views have not met with wide acceptance. The chapter offers an interpretation of his views that may make his conclusions more palatable.

Keywords:   metaphysical realism, internal realism, Putnam, correspondence, truth

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