Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Philosophy of LawCollected Essays Volume IV$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

John Finnis

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780199580088

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199580088.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 12 December 2018

Law as Coordination

Law as Coordination

Chapter:
(p.66) 3 Law as Coordination
Source:
Philosophy of Law
Author(s):

John Finnis

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199580088.003.0004

This chapter responds to Joseph Raz's response to the discussion of law's moral authority, particularly to his claim that it begged the question (argued in a vicious circle). But it does so by surveying the structure of coordination problems in the broad sense employed also by Raz and others, in which the game-theoretical, narrow concept of Coordination Problems is only one variant among many others (such as, at the opposite extreme, Prisoners' Dilemma Problems). The differentiation draws, as in Natural Law and Natural Rights, on Edna Ullmann-Margalit. It allows the retention of the game-theoretical concept of salience, and shows that the ‘procedural’ features of the Rule of Law are integral to law's salience as a scheme for cooperation for common good.

Keywords:   Raz, Coordination Problems, game theory, salience, Ullmann-Margalit, Rule of Law, moral authority of law

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .