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Philosophy of LawCollected Essays Volume IV$
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John Finnis

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780199580088

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199580088.001.0001

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Weber, Objectivity, and Legal-Rational Authority

Weber, Objectivity, and Legal-Rational Authority

Chapter:
(p.211) 9 Weber, Objectivity, and Legal-Rational Authority
Source:
Philosophy of Law
Author(s):

John Finnis

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199580088.003.0010

This chapter makes a fundamental examination of Weber's method and results in their bearing on the understanding of law and legal authority. It takes off from a critique of Anthony Kronman's 1983 book on Weber as a sociologist of law (and economy, authority, and religion), but shows with textual detail why Weber concluded that the ideal-type or central form of social authority is legal-rational authority, and the central form of that, in turn, is the value-rationality encapsulated in natural law theory. Weber's arguments for denying the rationality or objectivity of value judgments are critiqued, as well as Kronman's attempted supplementation of them.

Keywords:   Weber, ideal-types, legal-rational authority, value rationality, value judgments, objectivity, Anthony Kronman

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