Distributive Justice and the Bottom Line
This chapter presents an unpublished 1979 essay which responds to a critique of the draft chapter on justice in Natural Law and Natural Rights. It emphasizes that in the classical conception defended in that chapter, judgments about justice and injustice must take into account all relevant considerations; ‘just but unjustified’ and ‘unjust but justified’ are excluded predicates. This bears also on the fairness of procedures for distributing benefits or burdens. But objective injustice is one thing and subjectively culpable injustice can be another. The relation between justice and common good, e.g., in famine, is discussed.
Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.
If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.