Euthanasia and Justice
This chapter brings together the three phases of a rolling debate with John Harris about the justifiability of euthanasia. The senses of ‘euthanasia’ are carefully distinguished; the defining importance of intention is underlined and illustrated, and intention's moral significance is explored. The moral wrongness of choosing to terminate life is argued for as an implication of the reality of personhood and good of life even in the very young, very ill, or very old. The individuality of the early conceptus and the significance of radical capacity are explained against Harris's misunderstandings. The idea of the person in Harris and in Dworkin is discussed, as well as Dworkin's concept of critical interests. The final phases of the debate concern voluntary verses involuntary euthanasia, responsibility for side effects, the idea that some people ‘should die’, the dualism involved in denying radical capacity's significance, and the unfair implications of autonomous choices to be killed.
Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.
If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.