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Social Epistemology$
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Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar, and Duncan Pritchard

Print publication date: 2010

Print ISBN-13: 9780199577477

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2011

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199577477.001.0001

The Epistemology of Silence

Chapter:
(p.243) 12 The Epistemology of Silence
Source:
Social Epistemology
Author(s):

Sanford C. Goldberg (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199577477.003.0012

Epistemic disagreement is disagreement over epistemic principles, or principles concerning the reliability and extent of our epistemic methods. This chapter argues that disagreement over this sort raises a new problem distinct from skepticism. Like some skeptical arguments, the problem of epistemic disagreement is rooted in part in the issue of epistemic circularity. But it is not a problem about whether we in fact have knowledge or are justified in our opinions. It is about rationally resolving explicit disagreement over the reliability of our most basic methods for forming beliefs. The bulk of this chapter is concerned with getting clear on the problem and its nature. Finally, the chapter sketches a solution.

Keywords:   epistemic circularity, epistemic disagreement, justified belief, knowledge, rational resolution, reliability, skepticism

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