Germany: The Common Interest in Consensual Politics
This chapter shows that, in Germany, it was predominantly institutional veto points and party goals that facilitated the parties' consensus on their state funding that evolved in the early 1960s. As regards the institutional factors, the parties' constitutional status was of particular importance because it allowed the German parties to veto the interests of other actors, namely, the Constitutional Court. The parties were thus free to autonomously opt for a consensus-oriented mode of competition, resulting in reluctance vis-à-vis vote-seeking strategies. As expected in an environment shaped by influential veto points and an aversion towards vote-seeking strategies, the coordinative discourse on political corruption was largely dominated by the political parties and played no independent role in the politics of party funding.
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