Intergovernmental Institutionalization in the United States
In the U.S. power-sharing within the states favours the creation of strong intergovernmental arrangements. Complete alternations are rare, government interests are fairly stable, relative autonomy losses when engaging in intergovernmental cooperation are comparatively limited as are incentives for blame-shifting. While in most federal systems intergovernmental relations are executive-dominated, compulsory power-sharing in the American states lead to fragmentation. The governors and the state legislatures organize separately without a strong overarching body for state representation in place. Highly institutionalized generalist arrangements lobby the federal government. When it comes to horizontal policy coordination, it is again inter-branch divides which undermine voluntary coordination. In principle willing to share power, the states sometimes resort to interstate law – supragovernmentalism – and try to commit each other legally, which fails regularly. Therefore intergovernmental arrangements often push for the other extreme, the unilateral adoption of model laws across several states.
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