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The Handbook of Market Design
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The Handbook of Market Design

Nir Vulkan, Alvin E. Roth, and Zvika Neeman

Abstract

Economists often look at markets as given, and try to make predictions about who will do what and what will happen in these markets. Market design, by contrast, does not take markets as given; instead, it combines insights from economic and game theory together with common sense and lessons learned from empirical work and experimental analysis to aid in the design and implementation of actual markets In recent years the field has grown dramatically, partially because of the successful wave of spectrum auctions in the US and in Europe, which have been designed by a number of prominent economist ... More

Keywords: market design, game theory, empirical analysis, Internet, e-commerce

Bibliographic Information

Print publication date: 2013 Print ISBN-13: 9780199570515
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2014 DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199570515.001.0001

Authors

Affiliations are at time of print publication.

Nir Vulkan, editor
Associate Professor of Economics, Saïd Business School, University of Oxford

Alvin E. Roth, editor
Professor of Economics, Stanford University and Nobel Laureate in Economics 2012

Zvika Neeman, editor
Associate Professor, Berglas School of Economics, Tel Aviv University

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Contents

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Introduction

NIR VULKAN , ALVIN E. ROTH , AND ZVIKA NEEMAN

Part I General Principles

Part II Section A Matching Markets

Chapter 4 Market Design for Kidney Exchange

TAYFUN SÖNMEZ AND UTKU M. ÜNVER

Chapter 5 School Choice

ATILA ABDULKADIROĞLU

Chapter 7 Can the Job Market for Economists be Improved?

SARBARTHA BANDYOPADHYAY , FEDOR ISKHAKOV , TERENCE JOHNSON , SOOHYUNG LEE , DAVID McARTHUR , JOHN RUST , JOEL WATSON , AND JOHN WATSON 1

Chapter 8 Designing Markets for Ideas

JOSHUA S. GANS AND SCOTT STERN 1

Chapter 9 Redesigning Microcredit

ASHOK RAI AND TOMAS SJÖSTRÖM 1

Part II Section B Auctions

Chapter 12 Auctioning Rough Diamonds

PETER CRAMTON , SAMUEL DINKIN , AND ROBERT WILSON 1

Part II Section C E-Commerce

Chapter 13 Ending Rules in Internet Auctions

AXEL OCKENFELS AND ALVIN E. ROTH

Part II Section D Law Design

Chapter 19 Legislation with Endogenous Preferences

AVIAD HEIFETZ , ELLA SEGEV , AND ERIC TALLEY 1

Part III Experiments

Chapter 20 Common‐Value Auctions with Liquidity Needs

LAWRENCE M. AUSUBEL , PETER CRAMTON , EMEL FILIZ‐OZBAY , NATHANIEL HIGGINS , ERKUT Y. OZBAY , AND ANDREW STOCKING 1

Chapter 21 Information Disclosure in Auctions

MARTIN DUFWENBERG AND URI GNEEZY 1

Chapter 23 The Inefficiency of Splitting the Bill

URI GNEEZY , ERNAN HARUVY , AND HADAS YAFE 1

Part IV Competing Designs

End Matter