Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Causation and Laws of Nature in Early Modern Philosophy$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Walter Ott

Print publication date: 2009

Print ISBN-13: 9780199570430

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2009

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199570430.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 26 April 2019

Necessity

Necessity

Chapter:
(p.219) 25 Necessity
Source:
Causation and Laws of Nature in Early Modern Philosophy
Author(s):

Walter Ott (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199570430.003.0026

Among Hume's most famous arguments, we find his own version of Malebranche's “no necessary connection” argument: roughly, if x had the power to produce y, it should be impossible to conceive of x without y. But since it is always possible to do this, there cannot be any real (mind‐independent) causal connections. This chapter shows how the argument comes into focus only when seen as an episode in the larger argument from nonsense. Although the conception of causation as logical necessitation, which forms the target of Hume's argument, has its source in the scholastics, it lives on in the cognitive and geometrical models. The chapter shows just how Hume's argument applies to these models and points toward Hume's own subjective account of necessity as the felt determination of the mind to form one perception on the basis of another.

Keywords:   logical necessitation, conceivability argument, Malebranche, Hume

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .