Sorensen on Vagueness and Contradiction
This chapter discusses some themes from Roy Sorensen's book Vagueness and Contradiction. While agreeing with Sorensen that the major premise in a Sorites argument must be false, it rejects the consequences that Sorensen draws from this: that vague predicates have sharp boundaries, and that the phenomenon is to be explained in terms of ‘truthmaker gaps’. It is argued that ‘gappy’ theories of a variety of kinds, including McGee and McLaughlin's theory, misrepresent the phenomenon of vagueness. Further, some of the problems Sorensen raises disappear on a degree-theoretic approach to vagueness.
Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.
If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.