Scope Confusions and Unsatisfiable Disjuncts: Two Problems for Supervaluationism
This chapter considers two problems for supervaluationist accounts of vagueness. First is that the best (canonical-supervaluationist) explanation of our inclination to accept Sorites premises attributes to us a tendency to confuse the scopes of a Truth operator with the existential quantifier. This explanation is shown to be incorrect as well as incomplete. Second, a well-known complaint against supervaluation semantics is that it allows for a disjunction to be true even though none of its disjuncts is in fact true. A new, related complaint is developed: supervaluation semantics allows for a disjunction to be true even though none of its disjuncts could be true.
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