How to Respond to Borderline Cases
Some philosophers seem to think that borderline cases provide further cases of apparent faultless disagreement. This chapter argues against such a suggestion. It contends that with respect to borderline cases, people typically do not respond by taking a view, in contrast to what is the case in genuine cases of apparent faultless disagreement. It shows that the claim of the chapter is indeed respected, and is accounted for by paradigm cases of semantic and epistemic views on the nature of vagueness. It is also argued that this claim turns out to be, initial appearances notwithstanding, compatible with other claims in the literature; to the effect that in appropriate circumstances, there are indeed, or there might well be, ‘macho’, admissible, forced, and hesitant responses to borderline cases.
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