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Subjective ConsciousnessA Self-Representational Theory$
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Uriah Kriegel

Print publication date: 2009

Print ISBN-13: 9780199570355

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2009

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199570355.001.0001

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Self‐Representationalism and the Reduction of Consciousness

Self‐Representationalism and the Reduction of Consciousness

Chapter:
(p.266) 8 Self‐Representationalism and the Reduction of Consciousness
Source:
Subjective Consciousness
Author(s):

Uriah Kriegel (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199570355.003.0008

This chapter argues that the self‐representational theory accounts for the sense that there is an explanatory gap between physical facts and the facts of consciousness. Kriegel suggests that that sense is due to the fact that, unlike all other properties, consciousness appears to resist functionalization, even though it does not actually resist functionalization. The appearance of resisting functionalization, in turn, is ultimately due to the self‐representational nature of conscious experiences.

Keywords:   functionalization, explanatory gap, hard problem, reduction, reductive explanation, self‐representationalism

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